

Abolition of Janissary Corps and Socioeconomic Reflections^{1*}

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Abstract:In this work, it was firstly focused on the position of janissaries in market in late period and their historic role as a social power. After that, it was evaluated that the elimination of janissaries, got penetration in social and economic fields, brought about the reflections on economy and 'kalemiye² ilmiye,³ seyfiye⁴' within social perspectives. Tağış/devaluation, confiscation, new institutionalization in treasure and price-demand-wage on the market was worked in economic reflections. Also within the confiscation, an account book registered D.BŞM.DRB.d.16706 of Başmuhâsebe Darphane-i Âmire in Ottoman Archive Catalogues of Prime Ministry was firstly used in this work.

Key Words: Elimination of Janissaries, Abolition of Janissary Corps, Socioeconomic Consequences.

JEL codes: N35, N45, Z13

1. Introduction

Janissaries were an important part of central authority in Ottoman Empire. Those soldiers, especially in the late 16th century, sought several sources of income after the inflationist pressure decreasing the purchasing power and the deterioration of discipline inside Janissary Corps. They have penetrated the social and economic fields of The Empire for centuries. As they spread to a wider range in the market and became stronger in the guilds (lonca). Especially in the 18th century, they had a wide and deep influence in socioeconomic structure. Indeed, as a continuation of the historical process of the janissaries, there was a deep and wide relation between last janissaries and society, market. As a natural consequence of this historical background of the janissaries, the abolition of the Janissary Corps (janissaryism) also requires an examination of the socio-economic consequences. In this respect, examining the social and economic results is a kind of necessity brought about by the social and economic relations of the janissaries.

2. Janissary Corps: Establishment and Abolition

Although the janissaries was not one of the founding elements of the Ottoman Empire, they played one of the biggest roles in the transition from the principality to the state and institutionalization. The Ottomans found both statesmen and soldiers among the local elements during the establishment period. However, none of the military elements, such as "Yaya and Müsellem Corps"⁵, and later Azap⁶ and Sipahi⁷, were central military. As a result of the need for the central army, Murad I needed a more serious organization. The Janissary Corps was the answer to this need. Mebde-i Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân, written by a former Janissary in 1606 on the operation and principles of the Janissary Corps, points out the Eflak Campaign of 1363 during reign of Murad I as the foundation date. (Sakin, 2011) Uzunçarşılı (1988) also gives the same time as a foundation date and gives the registration of code as 1362 or 1363 by using

* This study is based on the master thesis named "Social And Economic Aspects Of Abolition Of Janissary Corps".

² Civil bureaucracy

³ Religious bureaucracy

⁴ Military bureaucracy

⁵ Peasant-soldiers with assigned farms, active in early Ottoman armies

⁶ Literally, "unmarried"; a kind of peasant militia, originally made up of unmarried youths who served as foot soldiers in the early Ottoman army; infantryman serving in forts; seaman serving on galleys and shipyards.

⁷ A cavalryman, remunerated through military fiefs or timars and financed by village taxes, participating in the sultans' campaigns. He was stationed in the provinces and formed part of the provincial cavalry of a given sancak.

Penchik Act⁸ mentioned in Mebde-i Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân. (Sakin, 2011)

Janissary Corps, with its classic form in 16th century, was organized in ortas⁹. It had 100 Cemaat (or Yaya) Ortas, 61 Ağa Bölüğü (Agha's Troops) and 34 Sekban Bölüğü (Sekban Troops) and totally numbered 12.000-15.000 personnel. (Küçükyalçın, 2013) This number has increased gradually with irregular recruitment as a result of -in some measure- necessity -but mostly- disciplinary deterioration. The abolition of The Corps dates from 1826. If the process leading to the Abolition is examined, a professional state policy will stand out.

Orhan Sakin (2011) classified this process in 8 stages: elimination of elite officers and secret staffing (cryptic caderisation), play one officer against another, structuring state cadre for operation, strengthening supporter military units, propaganda activity, getting janissaries over a barrel and eventually disposal and destruction after sedition and trap. Here, until the morning of Friday, June 16, 1826, all this process of the Abolition took place step by step. Finally, on June 17, 1826, it was attempted "to demolish the Corps and to wipe off the name of janissary from the face of the earth in such a way that there was no trace of it." (Mutlu, 1994)¹⁰ According to Fatih Efendi of Şirvan, it took twenty minutes to suppress the last rebellion of the janissaries and to burn their barracks. (Beyhan, 2001) Necessary information was provided about the banning of all military, administrative, hierarchical and cultural matters related to the janissaries by sending emr-i âlî immediately after the Abolition. According to Sezer, the reflection of the Abolition in the provinces was in the form of obeying the orders rather than being negative. (Sezer, 1997)

The references about how many of the janissaries were killed and how much of the general number of staff during the abolition of the Janissary Corps are giving different figures. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı (1988) says that we do not know its number of staff during the Abolition, however, "it is likely to be one hundred thousand," he says. We also know that the

British Ambassador Stratford Canning gives a total number of janissaries as 70.000 for this period, of which 40.000 were of a pay ticket (esame)¹¹, 30,000 of which were of assigned/active personel. (Yıldız, 2009) In addition, with the account of Tefik Güran (2014), we can assume that the population of Istanbul is approximately 450 thousand in the 1830 census. Assuming that there has not been a serious migration in the past few years due to the implementation of the trip permission (mürur tezkeresi)¹², it can be estimated that Istanbul had, until a few years ago, a population coming close to number in 1830. In other words, we can say that the ratio of the janissaries to the total population of Istanbul is approximately 20% in 1826.

On the other hand, we cannot reach a clear figure regarding the number of executions and exiles. Erhan Afyoncu (2010) cites the number of janissaries killed as approximately 10.000 and those exiled as over 20.000. Orhan Sakin (2011) states that approximately 6-8 thousand janissaries were killed in reliable sources. However, there are some who say that this figure is around 200-300, like Mehmed Daniş Bey. (Mutlu, 1994) In the same manner, in Üss-i Zafer which is a monography written by Esad Efendi just after the Abolition, he says that more than 300 janissaries were killed within Abolition day. (Arslan, 2005) Gültekin Yıldız also cites -citing from David Porter- 1800 figures for Istanbul and 1200 figures for provinces as a utilizable figure about deaths. However, it should be noted that Yıldız (2009) also added that Canning conveyed the number of executed figures as 8000. Of course, apart from these figures, there are also exaggerated figures. For example, it was mentioned that the number of punished janissaries (both and exiled-executed) was about 60.000. (Fowler, 1854) If we express by considering all these numbers; we can accept 6000-8000 janissaries or pro-janissaries were killed and approximately 15.000 janissaries or pro-janissaries were exiled. Thus, it will be understood that the total number of executions or deaths which constitutes a small amount of the population of Corps and Istanbul, that is

⁸ During the period of Murad I, one fifth of prisoners of war are the Sultan's share according to the Penchik Act and made use of in internal services of the palace

⁹ An orta equivalent to battalion/company/troop.

¹⁰ In the words of Mehmed Daniş Bey: "Ocakları'nın külliye ref'ine ve rû-yı arzdan yeniçerilik namının eseri bile" kalmayacak şekilde ilgasına girişilmiştir.

¹¹ It is the regimental payroll registers that provide detailed accounts on specific janissary regiments. As a practice, each janissary was issued a pay ticket (esame) on which his name, his paternal name, his regiment, and the amount of his entitled wage were recorded.

¹² This means a sort of the domestic passport or travel permits used to prevent people to migrate to a province from another.

respectively 10% and 1.5-2%. Accordingly, the same rates are around 20% and 3.5% for exiles.

3. Socioeconomic Position of Recent Janissaries

Janissaries have entered many areas of social and economic life in the Ottoman apart from barracks. From a historical perspective in the Ottoman Empire, the influence of the janissaries in economy is closely related to the weight of the state in economy. One of the points that our historians have agreed is undoubtedly that the tax exemption of the janissaries was attractive to the public. In this context, it is clear that the state's insistence devoted to increase tax had resulted in the janissary being a requested class or coterie. Otherwise, the number of people who had already gone and asked to enlist soldiers would be too low. But, an upward trend in tax rate in the Ottoman Empire was bringing a stronger support of the society towards Corps. At this point, as well as one-way demands from the people towards janissaryism, there were demands (like an undertow) for economic reasons from the janissaries towards public in order to enter into social life and market.

In a word, it is important not to consider the relationship here unilaterally. In this context, the state itself had employed soldiers in the required business areas. Within the Empire, the soldiers were employed in the fields of mining, construction, crafts and agriculture. Even the workers of the first factories established in the Empire were soldiers.

(Özbay, 2003) If we have all these in mind, it is not difficult to guess that the killing of thousands of janissaries overnight and following experiences of both executions and exiles will have a market effect. The results of these important effects were also varying by time and geography. In this sense, in order to see the economic and social consequences/reflections of the Abolition of Janissary Corps, it is necessary to look at the economic and social influence of the janissaries on the eve of Abolition.

The professions of those who are included in the list of those punished after the Abolition show how broadly they operate in the market. Some of them are *stallholder, basket maker, soap maker, merchant, kebab seller, fez/tarboosh maker, shoe maker, coffeehouse owner, blanket maker, hat maker, weigher, carpenter, butcher, dyer, blacksmith, boot maker, tobacco dealer, pastrami maker, bottlers and porters*. It is not possible to classify as a merchant. So it is not possible to classify them just as a kind of lumpen esnaf¹³, black marketeer or racketeer. (Kaya, 2013; Üstün, 2002)¹⁴ Based on this, it can be clearly seen how the janissaries have relationship with different types of community members and are active in all parts of the market. *The esnaf janissary*, in this sense, engaged in a wide variety of crafts and trades.

Accordingly, the data we have transferred from Sunar's (2010) study will inform us about the recent janissaries.

Chart 1: Distribution of pay-tickets held by janissaries with esnaf titles¹⁵

Janissary Ortas	Total Number of pay-tickets	Total Number of pay-tickets held by esnaf	% Value
96 th (1815/1816)	1.297	483	37
96 th (1823/1824)	1.273	380	30
97 th (1812)	318	23	7
12 th Sekban (1822)	57	17	33

Source: Sunar, 2010. BOA, Yeniçeri Kalemî Defterleri (D.YNÇ), 34919 (1231 / 1815- 16), 34997 (1239 / 1823-24), 34839 (1232 / 1816-17), 34978 (1238 / 1822-23).

According to Sunar's study about janissary pay tickets (esame) before Abolition, these janissaries who hold the nickname/title of the craft/artizan are one-third of the ones whom Sunar took as sample of janissary esams. According to Sunar (2010) "considering the problems with these data obtained from the books, it is likely that this rate is actually higher." According to the study, starting from the

quantitative superiority in the occupational distribution, the ranking is as follows: box making, stone working, seamanship, textile, household producing, food sector, silversmith, calligraphy, gunsmith and pyrotechnics. (Sunar, 2010)

According to another work of Sunar (2009: 186) among the janissaries who were sentenced to exile

¹³ Tradesman or craftsman

¹⁴ pazarcı, kutucu, sabuncu, tacir, kebaççı, fesci, yemenici, kahveci, yorgancı, külahçı kantarcı, doğramacı, kasap, boyacı, demirci, çizmecı, tütüncü, pastırmacı, şışeci ve hamal

¹⁵ nickname/title of the craft/artizan

and death, those who have the title of tradesmen are not few. 167 of 271 janissaries in Istanbul and Edirne among 490 janissaries who were punished following 1826 had esnaf title. In addition to these data, Sunar states that the janissaries with esnaf title are handicraftsmen who work in jobs that require skills. These; Carpet maker, baker, green grocer, pastry shop, coffee maker, tinsmith, locksmith, shoe repairer, tanner and masonry are specified. These data do not seem to have confirmed the view of Kafadar (1981) that the janissaries were engaged in simple jobs instead of heavy jobs and remained a kind of lumpen esnaf. In other words, janissaries had been dealing with serious works required craftsmanship in the market. From this point of view, Sunar (2010) does not see the views that the janissaries come from socioeconomic groups often called "foot team", which are frequently repeated in primary and secondary sources.

Here, the datas transferred by Kafadar (1981) are also important in terms of the expression of the janissary enlistment and their social position. The habits of people who came to Istanbul, likeenlisting as a janissary or being protected by any janissary orta after finding a job, became a capital culture. Some of the people who came to Istanbul from various parts of the empire preferred professions such as porters and boatmen, which we can call the lower social class of the capital. (Kafadar, 1981) Following the Abolition, these people were given the trip permission (mürur tezkeresi) and sent from Istanbul. In addition to this, many people such as coppersmith, limestone craftsman, sawer, stonemason, cookie maker, papermaker/seller, dried fruit seller and greengrocer tradesmen were exiled to cities such as Kütahya, Tulca, Bursa, Sinop, Gelibolu, Kastamonu and Bartın due to their relationship with janissaries. (Yaramış, 2006)

In this context, according to the data of a notebook prepared in 1802, 2000 of 6,500 boatmen in Istanbul had military titles. And also it was stated that most of the porters/roustabouts on Yenikapı, Bahçekapı, Balıkpazarı, Yemiş, Çardak, Balkapanı and Balat piers along the Golden Horn were either members of the Janissaries or 'taslakçı's¹⁶, that is to say each pier was under the control of a janissary orta. Sunar (2010) is in favor of accepting these porters as *taslakçı*, not regular members of Janissary Corps. Indeed, regardless who they are, many people from this segment of market were exiled or put to death after the Abolition. According to what Baykara added, the boat was in trouble at

this time and the Turk porters were replaced by the Armenians.

The Janissaries encouraged some of the boatmen, plowmen and porters to plunder during the rebellion, which is one of those who were also being prosecuted. Most of them were exiled to their hometown. In the meantime, there was also no one to intervene in Istanbul fires between the removal of the janissary firemen (tulumbacı) and founding a new organization (it was established a few months later). (Baykara, 1995)

In this context, according to the study of Sunar, we can consider that janissaries work within the framework of the standard guild (lonca) order contrary to considering janissaries as undisciplined, disorderly bashi-bazouk units in the market/industry. For example, the presence of the janissaries with an apprentice title in the 96th Cemaat Orta is really attention grabbing. An important issue about aforementioned notebook is that the names of the apprentices are usually recorded with the names of their masters. In this direction, when looking at the distribution of the market, almost half of those who held a pay ticket (esame) with the apprentice title are among the members of the 96th Cemaat Orta and are engaged in the basketry profession which is the most popular profession in this orta. A new, for example, there is a janissary being standard-bearer among these apprentices. In other words, there are examples showing that the ranks of the janissaries were not the same in their professional level. In other words, it is possible to question the correctness of the generalizations in which it is alleged that janissaries, by using the military status, impose themselves upon the guilds (lonca) and gain advantage via non-economic factors. (Sunar, 2010)

Despite this wide spectrum, shopkeepers/craftsmen did not favor the janissaries who were among themselves for a long time. It can be said that until the 18th century, people and craftsmen approached cautiously to the normal economic and social activities of the janissaries. Because the janissaries have been disturbing the public in various fields. Among them there were forcing merchantsto shake down, providing personal benefits, sexual assault, attacking women, fraud, flouting to law, putting pressure on the people, threatening the sultan. (Beyhan, 1999) However, it is clear that there was a break in this resistance of the people with the 18th century. And even the emergence of the janissaries as a protector

¹⁶ Taslakçı or taslakçı are those who are not regular janissaries but somehow they are supporters or relatives of janissaries.

in the economic field, especially in the second half of the 18th century, made them a purely commoner and even an important factor for the people. Nevertheless, it should be reminded that the janissaries had an unpleasant part with the people and order that their clashes with the classical artisan culture continued from time to time. (Beyhan, 2003) That conflict caused the provisionist Ottoman economy to become heavier and slower. It was controlled by Kadi (Muslim judge) whether or not craftsmen/shopkeepers acted in accordance with sharia and local customs (orf). (Genç, 2014) However, there was no serious investigation and prosecution due to the fact that the janissaries did not comply with the price fixing (narh) arrangements. Especially Kadi's punishment and practices against to the craftsmen were not properly executed to the janissary-esnaf (esnaf-yeniçeri). And also, in terms of market, the persons, working under the command of the chief muhtesib¹⁷ who is responsible for the market supervision, were selected from the "koloğları"s who were janissaries from the 56th Ağa Bölük Regiment. (Sunar, 2010) All of these were the factors that made the market largely corrupt. While all these are known, the fact that the janissary esnaf also increased its power in the market through guilds came to mean that janissaries were the control mechanism itself, both as a law enforcement agency and as an economic agent. Thus, with the Abolition of the Janissary Corps, this control mechanism, which is in question in all areas and which is carried out mostly against the center, was destroyed. Namik Kemal also pointed out that this internal control mechanism was destroyed by the the Abolition of the Janissary Corps, and that the new centralist state structure could not compensate this mechanism. (cited by Faroqhi, 2014)

On the other hand, it can be asked whether or not the distribution of janissaries', with a considerable amount, in the market presents a regulatory and protective image or a disruptive image. It should be noted that it is difficult to reach a general opinion on this matter. Because it is predicable that the janissaries protected either each other and the market with a sense of brotherhood and solidarity, but on the other hand it can't be ensured that janissaries' protectionism was in favor of or against economic agents or the people.

Starting from the 16th century and being increasingly intensifying, the relationship between janissaries and the market is affirmed by the data about the recent janissaries. It can be said clearly that the janissaries don't have a military order isolated from the society and the market. Especially mentioned in the 18th century, The social relations strengthened by the accumulation of janissaries in guilds and being 'a typical Ottoman citizen' is an important point in terms of our this paper.

Because, the existence of a strong opponent social power ultimately is related with the socioeconomic consequences of the Abolition. Indeed, the relationship of the janissaries with the market and the public is argued in terms of their role being a political voice of the lower classes.

4. The Elimination of Janissaries as a Social Power

As of the end of the 16th century, the quantitative growth of the janissaries naturally brought about a qualitative change in the members of Janissary Corps. In this context, their social relations and the military positions, which they maintain in social relations, have also made their role crucial in social context. Apart from this qualitative change of the janissaries, the utilitarian approach that Faroqhi (2013) called "Ottoman pragmatism", which was the main philosophy of the reform policies initiated by the Ottoman ruling class in the last two centuries, unfortunately strangled Ottoman people and caused an opposing base to arise against this approach with the help of the lost wars, the abandoned lands, the refugee raids and the rising prices. In this process, the most important socioeconomic position of the janissaries appeared. And we can name it being political voice of the people by penetrating social and economic domains. Historically, this economic mixture between military staff and people has also been a social consequence. In the words of Mardin, "a typical Ottoman citizen" was probably a member of a guild rather than a part of the management mechanism. (Mardin, 2015) Especially, after the convergence between janissary and guild which started in the 18th century, the opposition against reformation/modernization was getting stronger and finding a social base in this sense. In this context, it is the important that the janissaries are the infantry part of the Sultan's Household Troops.¹⁸ Because they found themselves in a double bind.

¹⁷Ottoman constabulary-official for public order

¹⁸ Kapıkulu Ocakları: The Janissaries and the salaried palace cavalrymen were known as The Slaves Of The Sublime Porte (kapı kulu), that is, the standing army of the ruler.

Because janissaries are included in the tax-exempt military group. Transformation of esnaf (craftsman/tradesman) and janissaries into a single person's identity means a strong rayah (reaya) and this transformation can be presented both as a cause and a consequence of the deterioration of the janissary institution. (Kaya, 2013) Ultimately, the social relationships between different segments of the society have deepened. As the Ottoman classical order deteriorated, a *trilateral union* came in view as the political power of society. This union was including janissaries, ulama and people (workers/esnaf-craftsmen) The opposition of this union against the Sultan Palace, which has the power, has caused many cases over the centuries, and even spilled the blood of the sultan. The opposition of this union, which against to the Ottoman administration, had caused many events over the centuries and even spilled the blood of sultans. In the Ottoman order, Şerif Mardin (2015) calls it as "janissary spirit" because of its aggressive spirit that undertakes the defense of the low-class defense. Niyazi Berkes (2011) sees this change and alliances of the janissaries as the biggest obstacle in the way of Ottoman modernization.

In fact, this dissenting voice achieved its political strength by means of the janissaries. After the Abolition, the changes in the Ottoman order made the critical role of janissaries visible, as the political voice of people. As a matter of fact, some of the New Ottomans, who is one of the first generations of the modern structure of the Ottoman Empire, also touched on this matter. In the wake of the Abolition, the new Ottomans believed that there was no unified social group in the Ottoman political system that would balance the power and influence of the Bâb-ı Âli¹⁹ bureaucrats. (Namık Kemal, 2014) Namık Kemal explains this issue in his article titled 'Letters About Consultancy Method – I'²⁰ dated 26 September 1869: "Before the Abolition, Devlet-i Âliyye was ruled by a will of ummah –in some way consultancy method-. The liability to review was met by people/community themselves instead of deputies. According to Namık Kemal, the Ottoman system could be described as a "limited government that has reached pre-eminently liberty"²¹ in terms of the role that the Ulama played in the adjudgment/legislation, sultan and viziers played in the execution, and the people by acting together with the armed forces (janissaries) played in the control of the executives' activities. At this point,

Keçecizade expresses the elimination of the janissaries in the state administration and the continuation of the bureaucracy very well:

We were three coteries: one is Ulama, one is people of offices, one is janissary. We all had gone astray. But Ulama and people of offices, we both came clean and threw ourselves at the mercy of Sultan, which is our difference from janissary. Janissaries misappropriated multifarious by not behaving according to their existing situation. Therefore, Allah overpowered them. We are saved under favour of confession."

From this point of view, it is not difficult to guess that lower class will lose their importance and some coteries will gain power as the janissaries lose power. In other words, after the elimination of the janissaries, it became difficult to mention the political discourse of the Ulama and people as a powerful voice. As a matter of fact, when he was counting the four basic classes that make up the state, Pertev Efendi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1829, no longer saw the need to mention the Ulama, and he firstly considered 'seyfiye' and 'kalemiye'. (Mardin, 2015) It would not be a coincidence that such an approach was introduced immediately after the Abolition of Corps.

In this context, Donald Quataert (2013) is one of the historians who draw a socio-economic framework for the janissaries. Quataert sees janissaries as workers' armed forces. According to him, in one sense, the abolition was carried out against labor force. In this respect, it should be emphasized that Quataert has already written his work by giving importance to the relationship of the janissaries with the people. Because Quataert (2013) expresses his intention explicitly and states that "this book contributes to the Ottoman history to add people, no matter how much it is wanting". Quataert complains that the quotations of the janissaries' roles in the economy are generally based on the works of the state chronicler (especially Esad Efendi). Naturally, as an attempt to legitimize the Abolition, he emphasizes that economically janissary activities have a one-sided style, which is cited from one-sided examples. In particular, he emphasized the periods; the entire 18th century and early 19th century. According to Quataert, the janissaries started to look after their economic and political interests since 1740. However, we cannot see any serious explanation as to why it started with

¹⁹ also known as Sublime Port or Ottoman Port

²⁰ "Usûl-i Meşveret Hakkında Mektuplar-I"

²¹ "hürriyetin derece-i ifratına varmış bir hükümeti meşruta"

1740. However, there is a point where Quataert and Kafadar are united on the issue is that the janissaries constitute the lower positions of the craftsmen/tradesmen. In this context, the janissaries can be regarded as the types that have come from provinces and are trying to survive. On the other hand, one of the clear points on which these two names cannot agree is that unlike Quataert considers the janissaries as a group protecting the rights of the worker and the lower class, Kafadar considers janissaries as exacter gangsters. Faroqhi is one of those who think that the Abolition of Corps causes lower class to weaken. Moreover, after the abolition, she says that the people and the sultan united against the bureaucracy, at which point she presents the March 31 case as a good example. Faroqhi (2014) describes this situation, this link between the sultan and the public, as a "social contract". Faroqhi attributes the decline of the revolts to the weakness of the lower class with the elimination of the janissaries. Beyhan also emphasizes that the reflection of the janissary spirit was seen in the case of dethronement of Sultan Abdülaziz and Sultan Abdülhamit after the Abolition of Corps. (Beyhan, 1999)

The partnership between the Sultan and the bureaucracy started to dissolve after 1826 when the Janissary Corps was abolished. In this context, the process proceeded till the fall of Empire in which it may be seen elimination of the Ulama, Kalemîye's getting position on safe side, Sultan's getting lonely. After Mahmud II reign, this structure, which clearly shows itself, continued even though it was interrupted in places. On this issue, according to Mardin (2015), Kalemîye, especially in modernist and reformist initiatives, were guaranteed itself jurally and left sultans as a spectator on the political scene during Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz reign. The tension which experienced in the administration, namely the Ulama-Kalemîye-Sultan trio, made itself felt strong after the Abolition. Because the janissary-people solidarity, which we can consider as the only front taking a stand against abovementioned trio, has been reduced to a harmless opposition position after the Abolition. While the political comfort, created by all this process, open the door many reforms, with this comfort it was the main critical issue that whose favor those reforms would be carried out for.

There is also an important breaking point here. After the Abolition, the political power of the Bureaucracy depended on the sultan's appointment and dismissal. In other words, bureaucratic cadres could not create an institutional power against Payitaht. An important element such as economic autonomy that will provide this power has been

provided by Tanzimat Fermanı (imperial rescript); removal of confiscations. When the Sultan lost his right to confiscation, a tool of political sanction over the officers in the upper positions, a considerable wealth was accumulated in the hands of these cadres. (Mardin, 2015) It is clear that this economic power also brought along political influence.

It will also be useful to look at the ulema front with all these developments. Because, the ulema class experienced the most serious problem in the process starting from the Abolition. One of the most important issues in this process is a kind of secularization effort of the state. The secularization tendency accelerated by Sultan Mahmud II was based on important reasons. The main purpose was to find money to finance the army, and attempts, which aim to put the foundations under the control of the state started in the 18th century, were intensified. Thus, after 1826, foundations were connected to a separate ministry and expropriated.

This has led to a considerable reduction in the political influence of the ulema, and especially the notables, who had significant revenues from the foundation administration until that day. On the one hand, madrasas were put under the control of the state, and on the other hand, these religious schools were neglected for the benefit of newly established technical schools. While Mahmud II innovated in many areas, he never touched the madrasahs and left the institution to his own. While trying to provide education and training in military and new civil schools in a contemporary manner, on the other hand, studies on religious and sharia issues by using Arabic book texts via traditional scholastic teaching methods in madrasahs have been slowly maintained. Especially with the Tanzimat, this dichotomy in education extensionally continued until 1924, when education and training were combined. (Çadırcı, 2013) According to Faroqhi (2014), this negligence incident was made consciously, so the ulema, which has an intellectual claim, had to choose other educational fields; the decision taken by the Mahmud II and his successors has a big role in existing those intellectuals not interested in religion in present Turkey. The differences of high and low-ranking in the Ulema are an important point in terms of relationship with the janissaries and the public. The bureaucratic cadres of the empire adopted a more innovative and reformist attitude during the 18th and 19th centuries compared to the general public opinion. It is well known that the ulema in the upper positions also allow many innovations to be the forerunner of the understanding that "Maslahat precedes everything else" .(Kara, 2012) However, the disturbance of the social base with every social

arrangement (some maslahats) pushed naturally the sub-ulema cadres to defend the classical order that would be in their favor. At this stage, the most favorable excuse was the rhetoric that the sharia was about to be lost or *kanun-i kadim* (ancient law) was betrayed. Thus, the lower cadres of the Ulema became the guardians of the Muslim people. (Faroqhi, 2013) Mardin (2015) also thinks that the distinction of high and low ranking ulema caused to raise importance of the *kalemiye* in the bureaucrats.

After 1826, the need for the participation and approval of ulema to reformation (Beyhan, 1999) decreased in the sequel early propaganda activities. Accordingly, as the political dependence on the ulema decreases, the functional influence of this institution in new-young establishments like military units, has also decreased. As mentioned earlier, it is undoubtedly a process accelerated by the action taken towards a central bureaucracy and a secular law and educational system. (Kapıcı, 2013)

Another important breaking point in social powers seemed in the military itself. The public regarded the janissaries as one of themselves, rather than seeing them as soldiers till the Abolition. However, with the *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiyah*, the military institution organized itself in a more modern way. It is clear that a strong state image (not militarily) emerged before the people after the Abolition of Corps. The public felt the presence of the state stronger after the Abolition, both through neo-institutionalization and the elimination of regional-local powers, or through the powerful statesmen appointed. However, it is difficult to say the same about the public's view of military power. Even the soldiers had to feel the power of the central government in this regard. It seems that the rulers of the Empire hoped to establish a new army, not a strong army, but an obedient army. About this issue Yıldız (2009) says "The purpose of the Sultan-Ulema coalition was to create an obedient armed force in favor of a bureaucratic and hierarchical organization." In the neo-institutionalization process, the ties of the people with the bureaucracy and the military were also based on official relations. In other words, by getting *Ortas'*, *Çorbacıs'*²², aghas' support, the military officers could no longer raise their voices as the public voice. Especially in company with the rising of scholar pashas and with the being autocracy on soldiery, People's tie with the military was kept officially. This situation gave birth to the affinity of the people and the sultan in time, and also enabled the

bureaucratic power to stand against this affinity. So, the people, from their own point of view, divided the state into two: Bureaucracy and the Sultan. The most important social reflection of the Abolition may be the loss of power of the people as a political voice, but the continuation of this process, as mentioned earlier, is the convergence of the public and the sultan against the bureaucracy.

Some social reactions which show that the new soldier is not considered sufficient in the battles with the Russians after the Abolition, will also be conveyed here. In this respect, it can be said that the abolition of the previous military power caused disbelief in the public in a way. For example, *Âşık Ali*, who tells about the Ottoman-Russian war that started in 1828, felt sad about the sultan and the new soldiery when Kars was occupied and expressed his feelings as follows: (Çoruk, 2007)

Old soldiers never make sail

Militias never play a hero

Wake up my Sultan, chastity is lost

Likewise, in those years, Âşık Rûşenî called out to Sultan Mahmud in the name of people living in the Balkans: (Çoruk, 2007)

Roses are withered, built turned into desert

...

The time is fortyfive, done, arouse my Sultan

These reactions from the east and west of the empire show that the soldiers were seen as inadequate in the eyes of the people. So Sultan was being thought responsible for this. Many propaganda activities have been carried out to prevent such reactions. In addition to many propagandas against the Janissaries and in favor of the *Mansure military*, tranquility was provided in Anatolia by means of the *Redif* organization. In fact, to some extent, the new army was brought to a good position in the eyes of the people, till *Tanzimat*²³. Nevertheless, the fact that the *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiyah* was insufficient in the battles in the first periods, which caused negative reactions to this army. But the public reaction to the new army is not in the form of rejecting it. Such that, the *Mansure Army* was in demand in terms of enlistment of soldiers. In this respect, it is not possible to say that there was a serious problem regarding the recruitment of soldiers and the shortage of soldiers. Indeed, many people, most of

²² commander of a janissary regiment like *Cemaat Orta* or *Ağa Bölük*

²³ The rescript of *Gülhane*

whom are sub-members of the society, continued to write their children or themselves as soldiers.

According to Mardin's (2015) report from MacFralane, while people from boatmen, stableman, hamals and similar lowerclassmen sent their children to the army medical school, no middle- and upper-class Turkish sons were sent to this school. In other words, the people actually did not resist the military service. David Urquhart (2014) also mentions that the Turks had never been troubled with enlistment because of considering military service as a "religious duty". In the countryside, we can say that the public was thinking well of enlistment even during the Abolition. For example, after the environment of confidence, the Aymtab people have made a commitment to the state under the supervision of Governor Celaledin Pasha, in order to provide 600 soldiers for the Asakir-i Mansure army and ensure their training twice a day. (Özcan, 2012) Positive examples like this can be increased. Of ordering the elimination of janissaries and organizing Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediyah, it is decreed that one hundred soldiers from Filibe Kazası (Plovdiv city/district) should be sent to the capital, who are young and strong but not self-indulgent. (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi; (BOA.) Cevdet-i Askeriye (C.AS.), 914: 39477)²⁴

As can be seen so far, there was no clear public opinion about the janissaries and the new army. Although the people were tired of the janissaries disrupting the peace, they did not see them as a viper's nest. In fact, resulting from the relationship between the janissaries and the esnaf, it was possible a serious opposition to a state policy that would put the public in a difficult situation and economically overwhelming. Thanks to janissaries' engagement, any rioting movement would have had a troubling condition for etatism. In other words, the janissaries were engaged in activities that create social disruption and were also the protector of the main political attitude of the public. For this reason, it will not be possible to gather the social reactions to the Abolition of Janissary Corps and the new army in a single front.

Considering all these, in certain points, we can emphasize the change before-after the Abolition. It can be summarized that janissaries have two important features in society. The first one is that they were the political voice of the rayah, perhaps it

was a legitimate sense. The second is that the janissaries had stronger relationship with the middle and lower classes of society compared to upper classes. In this context, it is important which of these two features have been affected the more seriously by the developments after the Abolition. The fact that the new army order established after the Janissary had a modern discipline and organization (not conventional) meant that it was difficult for the Mansure soldier to play an active role in the public. Because no soldier would be able to mind crafts and trade or establish relation with guilds anymore. He just had to perform his military service. However, it is difficult to say that there are many changes between the people and the army in terms of the second feature. In other words, young people who came to be enrolled or sent to the military after the Abolition were mostly of the lower classes. In fact, Yıldız says that there was an uphill struggle for power and career in the new army due to the fact that there are "Muslim devshirmeh" and poor family children of provincial origin who are eager to rise in palace and Bâb-ı Âli careers. (Yıldız, 2009) However, as we said, it was now difficult to play a social role or take a legitimate role in the words of Namık Kemal.

5. Economic Reflections in the Context of Political Freedom

If the janissaries are considered as producers in the market, as a social power and as a consumer (demander) in terms of their populations, it can be questioned that the elimination of janissaries create a difference in the context of supply-demand and the change of policies regarding the economy? This is the section where the answer to this question is tried to be found.

The breadth of the spectrum socially penetrated by the janissaries in the Ottoman Empire had to be taken into account in any political move. Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of the janissaries in economic life was a factor that made it difficult for the central authority to intervene in the market. (Sunar, 2010) As mentioned in the previous section, the elimination of the janissaries provided comfort for authority in terms of political freedom. In this context, taking advantage of the gap occurring after the Abolition, economic actions were taken to intensify the central power. For example, in order to reduce the regional domination of the Ayan²⁵, the tax collection privileges allowed for them were

²⁴ Its old name was The Ottoman Archives Of The Prime Ministry. It is renamed as "General Directorate of State Archives and Department of Ottoman Archives"

²⁵ Provincial magnates

given to other people. Large lands, which were also under the control of the Ayan in Rumelia and Anatolia, were confiscated and distributed to the peasants. In addition, 2,500 timar was taken from the timar-holding sipahis and left for iltizam²⁶. The Evkaf Administration was established in order to provide control of the units, such as land and similar economic resources that have been owned by the foundations and transfer their income to the central treasury. Ultimately, such attempts have reduced the strength of the provincial Ayan and ulema. (Pamuk, 2009)

The aim of centralization was not directly to implement reforms in the country in terms of politics and modernization. However, centralization and the Abolition were undoubtedly an economic move that would relieve central authority. For example, it is possible to talk about the low tax revenues that were obtained at the end of the state's tax collection process. One-fourth of the gross amount of the state's tax income and only one-third of its net amount fell into the central state treasury. (Pamuk, 2012) But the rest of tax income was being shared by some few involved in the tax process, such as the malikane holder²⁷, sarraf²⁸ who is a supporter of the malikane holders, the local authorities who collected the tax. Therefore, as the central authority consolidated its power, this process deactivated these intermediaries and stakeholders and also reduced their shares.

An important part of the activities of the janissaries in the market is their presence in the guilds. It was also through janissaries that some guilds make their presence felt as a political force in their regions. As a matter of fact, the guilds of cities such as Damascus, Cairo and Istanbul were able to create a "political pressure" (Faroqhi, 2014) in this way, even preventing the campaigns. In this context, we can say that the guilds that have strong connections with janissaries had lost power after the elimination of janissaries. From this point of view, we can see again that the abolition of janissaryism brought about the removal of the pressure on the political authority as well as the economic and financial policies of the Ottoman Empire.

Quataert (2013) stated that the guild system went to towns like Merzifon as well as big cities in the

Ottoman Empire and stated that this deep/dense classical order economy understanding was changed in favor of free market by 19th century statesmen. Here is a point that is important for our topic. In his work on the Ottoman manufacturing sector, talking about the turning point in 19th century, Quataert (2013) takes into account never Edict of Gülhane nor the Treaty of Balta Limani contrary to popular belief. Quataert, who interprets these two popular facts as two new nails nailed to the classical provisionist policy, sees the Abolition of Janissary Corps as a main turning point in Ottoman economic policy. In other words, he says that the Abolition is more than just an elimination of anti-modern reactionist soldiers. According to him, guilds (lonca) had lost their guards after the Abolition. Because the janissaries had a side to protect the city guilds against the intervention of the state and the elite class. (Quataert, 2013) The janissary power had become an important factor in the guilds, as the process in the market continued in its own flow for centuries, and the janissaries became a natural element in this system. The elimination of the Janissary Corps in 1826 greatly broke the resistance of members of the guild organization to a central decision, and well-organized strong protectionism supporters were eliminated. According to Quataert (2013), this led to the opening of the doors for Ottoman economic policy in transition from protectionism to liberalism.

We know that janissaries often take part in and react to market-oriented policies. However, it is not appropriate to describe janissaries' resistance against the central authority as a meaningless rebellion or a terrorist attitude. Because some policies, such as repeated depreciations²⁹ that central authority implement this policy its own favor, had consequences affecting esnaf, especially the esnaf janissary. The *Tağşiş*, as reduction of metal content of the Ottoman coinage and depreciation of currency, were the most important reason for price increases. (Pamuk, 2012) After the devaluation as a result of the depreciation of currency, the value of the janissary salaries was cheapening, besides the rising market prices. Since the profit rates that the state accepted as "legitimate for craft and trade" were generally within the limits of 5-15% from the 16th to mid-19th

²⁶ Tax farming system bkz: Agoston, Gabor and Masters, Bruce. Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire. Facts on File Publishing, 2009, pp555

²⁷ Malikane is a lifelong tax farming system.

²⁸ Money changers

²⁹ "Tağşiş" is a name used for a monetary policy in Ottoman Empire. It means adulteration, intermixing and the reduction of precious metal in coinage.

centuries (Genç, 2014), it was much more difficult for an esnaf janissary to survive in the market after the *tağşiş*. Hereby, it can be thought that janissaries' dissenting attitude against *tağşiş* enable stable money in Ottoman Empire. (Pamuk, 2012) In this sense, it is important that the janissaries seek their rights and symbolize a conscious social reaction. In the past, the state administrators could not carry out *tağşiş* policy freely due to the negative approach of the janissaries. But after the Abolition, they were more comfortable to follow a policy such as *tağşiş*. Maybe that's why; it is Mahmud II period in which the fastest *tağşiş* in the history of the Ottoman Empire were seen. As a matter of fact, the silver content of the *kuruş* was reduced by 83 percent between 1808 and 1844 and 47 types of silver coins were issued in the period 1808-1839. (Kopar and Yolun, 2012) Pamuk, (2012) divides Mahmud II period into two: the 1808-1822 period and the 1828-29 period. In this context, Pamuk says that we can evaluate the wars with Russia, Iran and Greece as the main trigger of the *tağşiş* in the first period, but for the second and also faster period for depreciations the war with Russia and its 400 million compensation burden is the main trigger. That is, he does not particularly emphasize the removal of the Janissary Corps. However, this period distinction coincides historically the Abolition, and Pamuk (2012) emphasizes on the relationship between *tağşiş* and janissaries in the ongoing pages.

Accordingly, the content of pure silver, which was 2.32 in penny in 1822, dropped to 1.47 in 1828. So there is a decrease of about 36%. In addition, we see an increase in the exchange rate from 37 to 59 on the same dates, from which we can say that the depreciation is about 37%. However, the *tağşiş* accelerated after 1826, when it was seen that there was freedom in policy making process, that is, there were no janissaries and there was no naturally harsh resistance against the *tağşiş* of 1828. Thus, the declines were higher in the following period compared to 1822. As a matter of fact, by virtue of various *tağşiş*, the silver content of the *kuruş* was reduced by 79% in 5 years after the Abolition.

Even up to five years after the Abolition, reliance on money was so shaken by the *tağşiş* that eventually the silver content was increased in the coinage that issued after 1832, which the tenth coin series of the Sultan Mahmud period. (Pamuk, 2012) Likewise, the sterling, which was around 19 cents when Mahmud II came to the throne, increased to 105 cents until the death of the Sultan. In this period, the pound, which increased from 20 cents to 32 cents in the 1810-20 period, increased from 58 cents in 1826 to 77.5 in 1830. (Çakır, 2012) Again, according to data

obtained by Pamuk (2012) from the various foundations' ledgers in Istanbul and the palace kitchen, the inflation for the same period reached from 30% in 1820 to 70% till 1830. In other words, there is an increase of approximately 130%. From this point of view, besides monetary policy, the existence of other factors on inflation can be discussed.

A different example of the political freedom, raised after the Abolition, is mentioned in the study of Kopar and Yolun (2012). Accordingly, the socioeconomic role of the janissaries sometimes reached that level that the Empire did not even dare to borrow from a foreign state. As a matter of fact, the issue of foreign debt was being seen as throwing Muslims at the infidels' feet. So, it had to be postponed due to the dangerous reflections among janissaries and ulema. According to the study, after the Abolition of the Janissary Corps, the issue of foreign debt was easily proposed an issue for the agenda and even in the 1830s, a number of British bankers and diplomats started to encourage the Ottoman government for foreign borrowing.

After the Abolition, in addition to the political authority, there was also a centralization in the new military system. Despite the partitioned organization of the old army, the Mansure army seemed in a body. Although this army was separated only as the provincial organization under the name of Redif, these units were considered under the Mansure army. This situation required that the financial resources previously reserved for the provincial army should be allocated to the financing of the new army. In other words, the centralization of the military structure and the system made it necessary to centralize the financial resources. (Cezar, 1986)

After the Abolition by which the central army was eliminated in 1826, there might be an authority gap and a lack of order. When as, the event which encourages the attempts to consolidate the central power politically in the Empire was the Abolition of the Janissary Corps. In addition to this, we can say that the Empire has not lost its power and control financially and has even been strengthened centrally. In other words, the Empire continued to carry out its reforms in the fields of finance, bureaucracy, education, law and judiciary in favor of centralization. In fact, Cezar (1986) considers the Abolition of the Janissary Corps as a turning point in the first half of the 19th century and draws attention to a centralization that reshaped the financial, administrative and civil structure. Indeed,

Cezar also denominates this financial centralization as “the process of new institutionalization”³⁰.

As it can be seen, military, financial and political centralization are the most prominent feature of the Mahmud II reign. At this point, we can witness that some of the classical Ottoman policies were also maintained in favor of the Sultan's authority. Although Mahmud II showed an attitude against the confiscation that had been applied to Sultan's servant for centuries in order to take the bureaucracy under control, after the Abolition he changed his attitude. In this process, we can witness the confiscation of the property of the abolished Janissary Corps and Bektashi Tekkes such in bureaucracy. In fact, although the removal of confiscation did not show itself practically in the first place, it was a promise to get support bureaucratic cadres of the Sultan in those difficult times. It can also be understood from the examples that he is lacking. Because even in 1837, there are examples that the Sultan confiscated. (Varan, 2013) The importance of this subject for the upper cadres of the Empire expresses an accumulation that has been coming for centuries.

The only aim of confiscation from the beginning is was to make the central authority strong. II. Mahmud finally used the confiscation system to strengthen the central authority. As a matter of fact, in order to break the influence of the *Ayans*, he executed the workers and confiscated his goods. Regardless of whether the deaths of those who died before or not were heirs, their conquests were captured. (Varan, 2013) We also know that after the Abolition, the state earned income through some Bektashi lodges and *zawiyas*. In other words, income could be earned not only through the assignment of a deceased person's estate, but also through the property and real estate of a foundation. After 1826, for example, the profits from the lease of some lodges, the rubble and bullets of the destroyed, and even their farms were transferred to the treasury.

For example, through the Kızıldeli Lodge in Dimetoka, central administration earned more than 200 thousand kuruş in total, from 1827 to 1851, and was transferred to the treasury. (Varan, 2013) This amount can also give us a clue about the enormous

number that will emerge when we take into account all the Anatolian and Rumelia after the Abolition.

We also know that the items/properties left after Janissaries Corps were registered. Silver vessels, copper and all other items belonging to Janissary Corps are sent to the Darphane after the Abolition. The quantity of those items were indicated in the arrival book of Bab-ı Defteri Başmuhasebe Darphane-i Amire Kalemi. (BOA. Bab-ı Defteri Başmuhasebe Darphane Defterleri (D.BŞM.DRB.d), 16706) The general classification of those items was made as sim (silver) -nühas (copper) -sair (others) wares and each type of item was subjected to a separate enumeration. It is also stated in the burnt wares called muhterik. Accordingly, a total of 481 silver-containing items (including several types customs, garnitures, bayonets, pitchforks, helmets, candlesticks, janissary headgears, etc.) and also a total of 97 copper items were registered on Thursday, 3 July 1826 (27 Zilkade 1241). (BOA. D.BŞM.DRB.d, 16706) 258 of them are mentioned in the records as muhterik (burnt). It was also stated that 14 items were "on the masters who were destroyed" in the At Meydanı (Horse Square). Likewise, in the Zilkade notebook, the record of the wares/items that came day after day was kept.³¹ As a matter of fact, 45 goods (knife, garland, silver caulk, etc.) were received on 23 June 1826 (17 Zilkade 1241) on Friday, and 6 muhterik (burnt) silver was also noted as 37.5 worth. Again, on Saturday, June 23 (18 Zilkade), 103 products (cast silver, utensils, envelopes and knives, chandeliers, skirts, etc.) were received and 200 muhterik (burnt) silver was recorded as 30.5 worth. On Sunday, 112 goods (iron door locks, silver poniard, knives, chandeliers, janissary headgears, customs, etc.) were received and recorded in various (burnt) gold, silver and coins. There are also many silver records in the burnt iron crate. Again, Monday 1177, Tuesday 127, Wednesday 5, Thursday 13, Friday 5, Saturday 3 (janissary headgears) are among those recorded.

6. Economic Reflections in the Context of Market

As mentioned in the first chapter, after the Abolition, there were executions and exiles in İstanbul. In general, it would be healthier to interpret the extent to which İstanbul was affected

³⁰ “yeni kurumlaşmalar süreci”

³¹ Within this scope, day-to-day records such as Friday, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday were kept but their open dates are not written. However, since the aforementioned notebook of Başmuhasebe is registered in the Zilkade, we estimate that it excludes the first Friday after the Abolition, and the days in question are until the 27th Zilkade date given after the next Friday.

by such a massacre that could not be ignored for that period, by looking at the capital's population, grains prices, the state of central power, and the state of money. One of the best data to show us the structure of the capital after 1826 is the 1830 census. After the Abolition, the first job of II. Mahmud was to focus on meeting the needs of the new army, namely Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiyah. For this, the population of the military age in the Empire and the tax sources had to be determined clearly. (Çadırcı, 2013) II. Mahmud made this census in the entire empire except Egypt and Arabia immediately after the Ottoman-Russian war. (Shaw, 2010) According to the census, the population of the Muslim family and the single population is 97.077 in total, while the non-Muslim family and single population is 115.256. A total of 212,333 people were registered in this census. With Güran's (2014) account; When the male population as a family is counted with their spouses and children, and the military staff and the undercount are added to this total, the population of Istanbul can be estimated at around 450,000. From this

Chart 2: Amounts of Grains Distributed to Istanbul Bakeries by Ministry of Grains (Kile)³² 1810-1835

Periods	Wheat	Barley	Other Products	Total
1810-1814	5.583.500	1.523.500	251.500	7.358.500
1814-1819	3.855.150	343.750	92.500	4.291.400
1819-1824	4.969.200	144.800	95.000	5.209.000
1824-1829	3.787.620	299.980	166.950	4.254.550
1829-1835	6.671.950	944.000	41.500	7.657.450

Source: Güran, 2014

When we look at the table, we can say that it is difficult to state fluctuation clear before and after the Abolition in total data. For example, for the period of 1810-14, with a total distribution of up to 7,353,500 kile, we see that the figure decreased to approximately 4,291,400 in the period of 1814-19, decreasing by approximately three million kile. Afterwards, we see that this figure has increased by one million bushes and formed the average of the period 1819-24. However, in 1824-29 period involving the Abolition, we see that it returned to the previous figures again. After this period, the demand almost reduplicate and this is really remarkable. That is to say, after the Abolition following regression, Istanbul's demand for grains increased again, and even at a higher rate compared to the previous periods. In other words, at least

point, Güran also made some predictions about the total food needs. Accordingly, if the annual wheat consumption of a person is accepted as 205 kg, the total wheat need will be 92.3 thousand tons in proportion to the population. At the end of the 18th century, Istanbul bakeries have an annual bread making capacity of about 97 thousand tons. So the amounts for the end of the 18th century and the 1830s are similar to each other.

We do not know clearly how many janissaries were killed and how many were driven in the capital after the Abolition. However, we can say that the most reasonable figure is about 20,000-25,000 people who are sentenced as 6000-8000 executed and 15,000 exiled. It is also important to what extent these figures affect the market in Istanbul and even if they cause weak demand. In this context, we can also make comments by means of the periodic amount of grains, such as wheat, barley, corn which distributed to the Istanbul bakeries by Zahire Nezareti (Ministry of Grains).

compared to the previous 10 years, we cannot imagine a serious population decline and a low demand which triggered by the Abolition.

It can be said that we can not see a sharp ups and downs apart from the fluctuation process from 1814 to 1829. In fact, a serious decrease and increases before and after these years attract more attention.

When the prices of the period are analyzed, a change is noticeable. Along with the Abolition, there was a decrease in the grains prices in the period of 1826-27. However, with an extraordinary increase in 1827-28 and ongoing periods, prices surpassed even the old periods.

³² An Ottoman unit of volume similar to a bushel.

Chart 3: Prices of Grains in Istanbul Bakeries Distributed by the Ministry of Grains

Years	Wheat		Barley	
	Kuruş/Kile	Index	Kuruş/Kile	Index
1821-2	3,89	120,8	-	-
1822-3	3,88	120,5	2,75	160,8
1823-4	4,11	127,6	2,75	160,8
1826-7	2,98	92,5	1,50	87,7
1827-8	4,38	136,0	4,25	248,5
1828-9	7,18	223,0	6,46	377,8
1829-30	13,00	403,7	7,00	409,4
1831-2	11,83	367,4	5,71	333,9

Source: Güran, 2014

In this context, the price decrease in the period of 1826-27 may be related to the decrease in demand after the Abolition. As a matter of fact, when we look at the amount of grain distributed to Istanbul bakeries in the Chart 2, we saw that the grain distributed to the bakeries in the period of 1824-29 decreased by one million kile compared to the previous period. The decline in this period, including the Abolition, is also approved in prices in this context.

In this heading, our second examination about the market will be labor (when considered the presence of janissaries in the market). Because the janissaries were not just a salaried consumer class. While some of these were in the market as soldiers and labor, others were in the market as tradesmen-craftsmen and even businessmen. In this regard, an assessment will be made in the context of labor shortages and wages.

If we examine in line with this section, determining the prices of wages in the market and population mobility have an important context. Özbay's work can create an important theoretical background in this context. Accordingly, the most important determinant of real wages in the short and medium term is the process of adjusting nominal wages to price changes. And also, the most important reasons for price changes are harvest conditions, transportation difficulties and wars that affect demand. The determinant of real wages in the long term is labor supply and demand. (Özbay, 2003) As a matter of fact, as it can be seen in Chart 4, there was no serious real wage problem by adjusting the nominal wages to the prices. However, in price change, an upward trend was observed because of not only conjunctural effects such as war (Russian War) but also liberalization of the central authority.

Let's continue with the data of Pamuk for the period in question. When we look at Istanbul 1469-1914 price index chart which prepared by Pamuk, we see that the period of 1820-29 including the Abolition,

is the period in which inflation increased in fastest way. Inflation for the period between 1800-1810 has increased from 25% to 40%, and also in the period of 1810-20, inflation came from 40% to 50%. Finally, between 1820-30, inflation increased from 50% to 100%. (Pamuk, 2012)

In other words, in the period of 1820-30, there is a boom in the economic course. If we take into account the issues which affected the general price level in the market, the first one is the Tağşiş policy, which has become easier to choose after the Abolition. In this context, the elimination of janissaries may not have an effect on the prices in the market. Because our investigation in terms of grains prices has given us an opposite picture for that period. However, we can say that the political liberalization to prefer Tağşiş policy after the elimination of the janissary opposition and the war with Russia at the end of the 1820s had a serious share in this inflation rate. In other words, it can be accepted indirectly that the interest has a share in this. However, in the period of 1830-39, the dynamism of inflation and wages showed that the elimination of the janissaries did not affect the market as much as the events in the 1830s. As a matter of fact, compared to the dynamic years of the 1830s, the previous period has followed a more favorable course.

Finally, it is difficult to say that there is a shortage of labor or qualified craftsmen in the Istanbul market after the Abolition. Because the central authority wanted that every development related with the Abolition must be resolved and closed at its own neighborhood with its all aspects. If exile is required, they should have been those who were exiled under surveillance. In other words, central authority didn't want to see any rambling fugitive people who would come to Istanbul. (Özcan, 2012) After the Abolition, it was worried about that the exiles whom exiled from Istanbul, would come back to Istanbul. (Sezer, 1997) If the center had a

shortage of labor or qualified craftsmen, it would not be expected to pursue a policy that closes its doors to the country. With all these aspects, good or bad, we can understand the elimination of the janissaries and the exile of many, so that the city was not afraid of a shortage of producers, workers or traders. In fact, the state took measures to prevent returning, and also orders/decrees were constantly written to Anatolia and Rumelia. (Çadırcı, 2013) Considering these, we can say that there was no production-trade deterioration that shook the market after the Abolition. However, despite the precautions taken, security could not be ensured and many people flocked to the big cities without a licence. Especially looking for a job, avoiding military enlistment and taxes were the main excuses for those who came to Istanbul.

When it is evaluated in the context of the charts, by considering whether or not the executions, exiles and the trip permission creates a labor shortage in the market; although we cannot examine the period of the Abolition years, it is noteworthy that the rate of change in inflation and the nominal wage exchange rate in the period of 1820-29 were in line with the general increase trend. In this context, the 100% increases which experienced in the 1830-39 period are more remarkable. In other words, we do not witness the rise in nominal wages for that period with a serious shortage in the labor.

7. Conclusion

After the Abolition of the Janissary Corps it was observed that the greatest support power of the people and the Ulama was lost and the social opposition was weakened. When the socioeconomic positions of the janissaries and their political roles were extinguished together with the Abolition, it enabled that the kalemiye and the central authority were distinguished as a strong class in the country against ulama and the people. This political liberalization in decision-making mechanisms played a significant role in witnessing the fastest Tağşiş policy of the Ottoman Empire. Because the janissaries who advocate monetary stability against policies such as Tağşiş have disappeared. The relief to apply Tağşiş policy also played a role in the inflationary effect in the market after the Abolition. However, in the short term, it has been observed that the effect of the Abolition was deflationary in the market. It can be said that this situation is related to the decreasing in the demand by looking at the demand of grains. In addition, the new military organization after corps-based organization brought both a new understanding of a central army and new separations and finally centralization in the treasury. At this point, the new institutionalization process had been paved. Well, ultimately due to the centralization process, one of the important results of the Abolition was the Maliye Nezareti (Ministry of Finance) in the 1830s.

Chart 4: Prices and Wages in Istanbul (Ten Year Average)

Years	Consumer Price Index		Nominal Day Wages				Real Day Wages	
	Akçe	Silver	Normal Labor		Qualified Labor		Normal Labor	Qualified Labor
			Akçe	Silver	Akçe	Silver		
1800-1809	34,7	1,91	114,4	5,3	217,7	10,0	0,84	0,88
1810-1819	49,5	1,86	202,6	6,9	401,2	13,7	0,95	1,04
1820-1829	62,8	1,26	275,9	5,0	475,4	8,9	1,13	1,10
1830-1839	130,1	1,12	608,8	4,5	1.054	7,8	1,11	1,05
1840-1849	181,0	1,70	717,2	5,9	1.238	10,1	0,99	0,95

Source: Pamuk, 2013

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